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Should Social Amplification of Risk Be Counteracted?’ 
Arie Rip’ 
The importance of the conceptual statement, by 
Roger Kasperson et al., on social amplification of 
risk lies, firstly, in the identification of a phenome- 
non as one worth studying, instead of being irritated 
and frustrated ibout it and concerned only to get it 
out of the way. Accusations of “public hysteria” and 
“ irresponsible media” are commonplace, without any 
real attempt at understanding causes and mecha- 
nisms, let alone a closer look at the normative 
qualifications of “ hysteria” and “irre~ponsibility”.~ 
Kasperson et al. provide a forceful summing up of 
the limitations of traditional, technical risk analysis, 
and propose to overcome the limitations by adding 
the phenomenon of public reactions to risk and 
further repercussions (“secondary impacts”). One 
may wonder whether this is sufficient; but it clearly 
is necessary. 
Secondly, the attempt at systematic description 
usefully articulates a number of dimensions and 
aspects of the problem. The added benefit is that, in 
doing so, some of the ambiguities become apparent 
-of the proposed analysis, but also of the way we 
tend to treat the phenomena of social amplification 
of risk. For example, although the phenomenon 
is defined in a neutral way, in the introduction 
and later when communications theory is invoked 
(“amplification denotes the process of intensifying or 
attenuating signals during the transmission of infor- 
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’See for examples the Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task 
Force on the Communication of Scientific ksk.(’) The irony of 
this publication is that the Task Force accuses the media of 
irresponsibility, in spite of the findings in the background paper, 
by Dorothy Nellcin, which is included with their report. 
mation”), the focus as well as the concern is about 
intensification and the additional social costs accom- 
panying “exaggerated” responses. The aftermath of 
Three Mile Island is given as a paradigmatic example 
of social amplification, while there is no complemen- 
tary example of the social costs of attenuation of risk 
(as, say, in the thalidomide affair or in some aspects 
of the swine flu vaccine affair). To emphasize ths  
particular ambiguity, I ask in my title if it is self-evi- 
dent that social amplification (in the sense of ex- 
aggeration, as all readers, and the authors sometimes 
as well, will take it) must always be counteracted. 
There are other limitations and ambiguities to 
be noted, and I shall highhght them in my comment, 
because I think the paper is right in addressing the 
issues, and deserves constructive criticism more than 
praise. In other words, I applaud the paper (both its 
content and the fact that it appears) as far as it goes, 
but it does not go far enough. I want to indicate 
some possibilities for further progress. 
The starting point of the paper is that conven- 
tional risk analysis neglects the important domain of 
responses to risk events and their repercussions, the 
social impacts for short. Therefore, the arsenal of risk 
assessment tools must be enlarged. One has to iden- 
tify and characterize the phenomena in this domain 
and add them, somehow, to traditional risk analysis. 
The authors choose to do this by adding a new 
event-consequences-effects chain to the one that is 
central to the traditional problem definition of (tech- 
nical) risk analysis: “The social structure and 
processes of risk experience, the resulting repercus- 
sions on individual and group perceptions, and the 
effects of these responses on community, society, and 
economy.” (In addition, the authors seem to dis- 
tinguish two stages in the consequences step, when 
they discuss “ response mechanisms.”) 
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As a tactic, this approach may well be heuristi- 
cally ~ s e f u l . ~  A full assessment, however, is not easy, 
because in the present paper, the third step, effects 
and their evaluation, is not discussed. The three-step 
model is in fact reduced to a two-step model: risk 
events or risk experiences, and their consequences in 
terms of responses. The paper actually stops rather 
suddenly when it briefly indicates that there will be 
“next steps.” 
Analysis of effects is indeed complicated, and 
one might be well advised to relegate them to further 
work. But one should at least discuss some of the 
issues, like feedbacks (which are mentioned), and the 
question of when attenuation of the signal is good 
(reduction of unnecessary social costs) and when bad 
[a warning signal does not get sufficient (political) 
weight]. Without due attention to “effects,” the ap- 
proach is too limited (and would require more soci- 
ology and political science inputs) and may be 
misunderstood as just a tool to handle those exag- 
gerated, irrational fears that people turn out to have. 
This is certainly not the intention of the  author^,^ 
but it is difficult to avoid such a message. I shall 
come back to this issue when I comment on each of 
the three steps of the full model in turn. 
40ther tactics can be thought of, for instance case study analysis 
and social experiments without any prestructured and stepwise 
model. Or one could, as I will argue later, start with a sociological 
model instead of communications-theory and psychological 
model. One could also, instead of adding to the arsenal, take the 
very different route of fundamental criticism of the possibilities 
and practical usefulness of risk analysis. That would require an 
improbable degree of reflexivity and relativization of risk analysts. 
’This is clear from passing remarks in the paper, and is also 
emphasized by Paul Slovic in the closing paragraph of his paper 
“Perception of Risk”(2’:COPY MISSING 
Perhaps the most important message from this 
research is that there is wisdom as well as error in public 
attitudes and perceptions. Lay people sometimes lack 
certain information about hazards. However, their basic 
conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of the 
experts and reflects legitimate concerns that are typically 
omitted from expert risk assessments. As a result, risk 
communication and risk management efforts are destined 
to fail unless they are structured as a two-way process. 
Each side, expert and public, has something valid to 
contribute. Each side must respect the insights and intelli- 
gence of the other. 
My proposal below to look at reception of risk signals in terms 
of reinvention is an example of a two-way conceptualization. 
To start with the first step, what is the “risk 
experience”? The metaphor of the stone in the pond, 
with the ripples spreading out, is a powerful one, and 
is used to good effect. But one may gloss over some 
important issues this way. What is the stone? In the 
paper, a variety of terms are used: “risk object,’’ 
“hazard event,” “risk event,” “risk source,” “ physi- 
cal risk itself.” For communications theory to apply, 
however, one must have a “signal about risk” (as the 
abstract says), and it is not clear whether an “event” 
or an “object” as such can be a sender. I am not 
quibbling about words, but making explicit an am- 
biguity. A sentence like “risk sources create a com- 
plex network of direct and indirect effects that are 
susceptible to change through social responses” now 
hides rather than highhghts, because the ambiguity is 
not resolved. Is there an event with impacts, indepen- 
dent of perceptions and social responses, while the 
(social) impacts, i.e., the social costs, can be in- 
creased or reduced through these responses? Or does 
one start with perceptions, recognitions, responses, 
and their repercussions? 
This is not idle speculation. There are examples 
of concerns about risk, responses, and social amplifi- 
cation, without a risk event: the Seattle wind screen 
pitting, the Christmas scares about gas explosions.6 
But I assume that in those cases there is a risk signal 
that can be seen as the start, even if it is vacuous, or 
based on misunderstanding of another signal. 
The implications of this point are, first, that it is 
not, at least not primarily, the nature of the “specific 
risk” or the “event characteristics” that determine 
the process of social amplification, as the paper says, 
e.g., in Fig. 2, but the nature of the signal. In other 
places, the notion of “clues” is introduced to indicate 
“signal potential” (cf. Table 1 in their paper), which 
seems a much more fruitful notion. 
Second, given the concern with unnecessarily 
high social costs because of social amplification, it is 
more important to understand why people do not 
check the qualify (or substance) of the signals they 
receive, than to understand how they transform and 
transmit whatever they receive. In other words, the 
problem is not so much individual bias, but social 
interaction. People-including experts and risk as- 
sessors--are biased, but what we hope is that in 
%ee my paper in Ref. 3. The Christmas scares example was 
mentioned to me in discussion by David Edge (Edinburgh). 
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spite of bias, something acceptable is produced out 
of the  interaction^.^ 
The neglect of the sociological returns in the 
second step of the model, where the process of social 
amplification is conceptualized. Although the con- 
cept features the term “social,” the focus of the 
paper is on the individual. There is discussion of 
social alignments, of networks, of mass media, but 
the central mechanism is seen as the reception of 
information by an individual, its processing and fur- 
ther transmittance. This conceptualization is as- 
sumed as self-evident, and indeed allows straightfor- 
ward application of communications theory.8 The 
further assumption, however, is that the processes of 
social aggregation and the transformations that occur 
there need not be studied as such, but can be cap- 
tured through factors (like cultural bias or competing 
interests) that impinge on the information processing. 
This is the way cultural residues of experience with 
hazardous events and risks are treated in the paper, 
but there is no indication how such cultural residues 
might emerge and sediment. 
A possibility to address social aggregation within 
the conceptualization used in the paper is to analyze 
the maintenance of socially defined objects, like 
“dread risks,” by modeling individuals as label- 
attachment devices. Barnes has used this heuristic to 
discuss phenomena of routine concept application, 
public confidence in banks, and self-fulfilling pro- 
~hecies.(~) This approach, though still rudimentary, 
seems to be relevant for the phenomena in social 
amplification of risk as well. It may well be neces- 
sary, however, to introduce more “active” models of 
the individual, and, by that, leave the simplistic focus 
on signals as information and social amplification as 
information processing. (To avoid misunderstanding, 
I add that the authors do treat social aspects and 
processes, but they seem to separate them from the 
primary information processing. For example, when 
they discuss the “chief attributes that may influence 
the social amplification of risk,” these are all attri- 
butes of the information, like volume, degree of 
disputation, misinformation, and symbolic connota- 
’Compare the idea that the quality of scientific knowledge results 
from the critical review processes in the scientific community 
rather than the craft skill, methodological purity, and ratiocina- 
tions of individuals. 
‘The references to communications theory are, to my surprise, 
rather old (1948, 1966, 1969). Has nothing happened since? 
tions. The arena in which the processing occurs, and 
the strategies of the different actors are discussed in 
a later section, under the heading “social group 
relationships.”) 
An interesting alternative possibility is to look at 
the phenomena in terms of adoption of signals, and 
use the literature on adoption and diffusion processes. 
Studies of adoption and diffusion of innovations, 
done by economists and policy analysts, now recog- 
nize adopters to be active, and emphasize that the 
process of adoption is not a matter of accepting or 
rejecting a given innovation, but modifying and 
transforming, in a sense, reinventing it.9 Such adop- 
tion and reinvention processes are treated as carried 
by an organization, group, or milieu, rather than 
being primarily an individualistic, atomistic process. 
One might look at the “hazard signal” as something 
that can be adopted and transformed by a group, 
and study the processes that occur at that level. If 
one does this, one might also be able to address the 
second aspect implied by “activist” models: often, a 
hazard signal is not just information-to-be-processed, 
but includes a (subculturally determined) action pre- 
cept, or just a general call for action without pre- 
scribing any yet.” Thus, the signal requires some 
“invention” of the people involved. Even when they 
fall back on general cultural categories, as Douglas 
and Wildavsky(*) and other cultural-bias theorists 
posit,” they still have to creatively relate the con- 
crete situation to those categories. 
In many cases, one could usefully introduce 
other perspectives, especially those drawn from social 
psychology and symbolic interactionism. I think, for 
example, of Weick‘s attempt to analyze responses 
and interactions in terms of “equivocation.”(”) 
Ambiguous cues or items have to be clarified 
(“organized”), for instance, by placing them into a 
context; Weick includes an example of the Swiss 
watch makers and their reaction to the ambiguous 
cue. “digital”-which evoked, at first, a response of 
attenuation of the signal (although they now have 
come back with a vengeance). An important point is 
that symbolically guided actions or “enactment” may 
become stabilized when they seem to help address 
’See the review by Irwin Feller,(5) and especially Refs. 6 and 7. 
“This is to be contrasted with the sequence in the paper, where 
information processing is taken to generate a propensity to act. 
”See also Ref. 9. 
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relevant circumstances. Weick discusses organiza- 
tions, but the following quote seems just as applica- 
ble to public handling of hazard signals: 
Whatever people do during enactment, whether it be 
operating without goals, misplacing personel, operating a 
technology that no one understands, improvising instead of 
forecasting, dwelling on opportunities, inventing solutions 
rather than borrowing them, cultivating impermanence, argu- 
ing, or doubting, if those “strange” actions promote rapid 
adaptation to shifting conditions, they’re likely to persist, be 
enacted repeatedly, and to be frequent inputs in the selection 
process (Ref. 10, p. 185). 
When discussing effects (the third step of the model), 
analytic progress is hindered by the ambiguity in the 
use of “amplification” that I noted already in the 
introduction. Communication theory may use the 
term to denote both intensification and attenuation 
of signals, but the reader will not always remember 
that, and the authors follow him (or her) by some- 
times contrasting amplification and attenuation. 
Apart from readers’ associations with the term 
“amplification,” it is also the authors’ concern that 
risks loom unnecessarily large because of amplifica- 
tion processes. Such an evaluation is implicit in many 
phrases, for example in equating “erroneous” with 
“exaggerated.” To show up implicit evaluations, one 
should try a little experiment, and replace “amplifi- 
cation” by “attenuation” everywhere in the text, to 
see how the argument runs then.12 
The problem with the terminology has also to do 
with the audience that the authors want to reach. It 
seems to be the audience of policy makers and risk 
analysts that experience exaggeration of risk, or what 
they see as exaggeration, and who do not understand 
the underlying processes. So they reaffirm technical 
risk assessment in spite of its limitations, and specifi- 
cally underestimate the variety of adverse effects 
attendant on risk events. The authors of the paper 
hope to broaden their understanding- which implies 
that one has to go along with their perceptions, and 
put the problem in their terms. I have no quarrel 
12The same tactic is used to show gender bias in texts. It is indeed 
cumbersome to continually talk of “he or she,” or write “s/he.” 
But a text written with plain “he” and other masculine words 
can have a dramatically different impact when all masculine 
words are substituted by feminine words. What about the fa- 
mous (early 16th century) book written by Machiavelli, titled 
“The Princess”? (I owe this example to Sharon Traweek.) In the 
same way, a paper on “Social Attenuation of Risk” will suggest 
a different argument, and enroll a different audience. 
with that, but it may reaffirm another bias of policy 
makers, viz., that their responsibility is primarily to 
avoid those social costs stemming from exaggerated 
responses to risk. There is another duty of public 
officers and all those worlung for the public interest: 
to avoid social costs due to suppression (or other 
forms of attenuation) of risk signals. There is not 
only specious inflation of risk signals, but also spe- 
cious red~ction.’~ 
Thus, there is another side to the problematique, 
and one way to explore it is by looking at early 
warnings and their filtering. The paradigmatic exam- 
ple here is Rachel Carson’s 1962 book Silent Spring. 
One problem in understanding early warning pro- 
cesses is that only the tips of the iceberg become 
visible, for example in whistle-blowing and so-called 
professional dissent.14 But there is increasing atten- 
tion to this “other side” of the issue, for example, in 
new approaches to technology assessment in Europe, 
which include institutionalization of early-warning 
n e t ~ 0 r k s . l ~  Designing what one could call “interven- 
tions in the social attenuation of risks” occurs often 
without full understanding of the processes involved, 
but experience with them will certainly be informa- 
tive. Another potentially very fruitful approach starts 
from the ways people handle technology: directly, in 
the routines that evolve- thmk of Morton-Thlokol’s 
handling of the checks of the space shuttle,16 and 
indirectly, through the strategic games in which tech- 
nological development and usage are framed.” In 
organization studies, the phenomenon of attenuation 
of signals has of course been studied (although not as 
extensively as one would wish). From the cultural 
bias theorists, there is now also an attempt to look at 
rejection of information as the primary process.(”) 
These brief references show that there is sufficient 
”See Refs. 11 and 12. The terminology of specious inflation and re- 
I4See Ref. 14 and the very interesting case study in Ref. 15. 
”In West Germany there are experiments with Friihwornungs- 
netze, and in the Netherlands, the Organization for Technology 
Assessment is creating a “societal address” that receives con- 
cerns and warning about technology. See Ref. 16 for some 
details. 
I6For a full discussion of the example and the general approach, 
see Ref. 17. Note that the approach differs from so-called 
“human factors analysis,” in that processes at the group level 
are taken as constitutive. 
“For a discussion of this approach in general, although without 
application to issues of risk attenuation, see Ref. 18. 
duction is adapted from Ref. 13. 
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interest and material to start analyzing the “other 
side” in earnest. 
In conclusion, I think that the conceptual state- 
ment has much to recommend it, both in contents 
and in the way it attempts to identify issues for 
study. Further work is necessary, not only in the 
directions the authors set out, but also, as I tried to 
show, by the inclusion of more sociological analysis, 
and by a more explicit and symmetrical treatment of 
intensification and attenuation, or of inflation and 
reduction. I do not know whether it is possible to 
overcome the bias of sequential analysis, where there 
is a source and there are consequences, with the 
attendant assumption that influences “on the way” 
will be distortions of the original signal. One thing 
should stand out: the phenomena of social amplifica- 
tion of risk are so important that we must mobilize 
all our intellectual resources to achieve some under- 
standing. 
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